The politics of virtue: conservative or liberal?

Phillip Blond has an article in today's Independent calling for a new politics of 'virtue'. According to Blond, both left and right have been guilty of peddling a moral relativism or nihilism which has created a moral vacuum at the heart of society and politics. The scandal around MPs' expenses is just one manifestation of this.

Blond writes:

'Clearly a new moral code is required. We need the concept of virtue. This ancient Greek and Christian notion transcends the current malaise and calls us to debate and discern the common civic good that alone is the basis for society. While contemporary morals abandon any notion of education and validate us and our "opinions" whatever they may be, virtue approaches humans on the basis of what they ought to be. Since virtue theory accepts the mediation of truth by time and context, it avoids the slide into exculpatory left-wing relativism. And it endorses culture and transformation. It takes moral conservatism out of the hands of an established elite and transfers it to us all.'

There is an interesting similarity here with a column by David Marquand in last week's Guardian. In an essay which contributes to clarifying the distinction between republican and populist responses to the present crisis, Marquand argues that the present economic and constitutional crisis reveals the poverty and redundancy of a 'neo-liberal moral economy' based on the celebration of material self-interest. Marquand writes:

'Now the neoliberal idyll is over. The casino has shut its doors. The neoliberal moral economy is in crisis. But the crisis is not the work of greedy bankers, lax regulators or corrupt MPs alone: they are only grubby flotsam floating on much deeper currents. It will not be ­resolved unless and until we acknowledge that we, the "people", are also part of the problem – that the real culprit is the hyper-individualistic, materialistic hedonism of the entire culture, popular at least as much as elite. I have been committed to radical constitutional reform for 30 years, and I rejoice at its belated appearance on the political agenda.

'But constitutional reform is not an end in ­itself. As John Milton and the Levellers insisted in the 17th century, and RH Tawney insisted in the 20th, it is a means to the greater end of moral reform, and without moral reform it would be an empty shell.'

Are Blond and Marquand making the same argument? Is this a point of convergence between the 'progressive conservatism' of Blond and the democratic republicanism of Marquand? If so, what are liberals to make of it?

It is hard to answer these questions definitively on the basis of these words alone, but there is potentially quite a big philosophical difference between Blond and Marquand - and one that tells in favour of Marquand, in my view.

The virtues are relative to some good. To have a 'virtue' is to have some quality or disposition of character which is relevant to achieving some kind of good. But what kind of good are we talking about?

Within the liberal tradition, we start from the insight that, in a free society, reasonable people disagree about the nature of the good life. Is there a God (or are there gods)? What does He/She/they require of us? How do we respond to the (alleged) absence of a God? These questions are central to discussion of the 'good life', and they are questions which reasonable people do, and probably always will, disagree about.

So a liberal will hesitate to rest an account of the virtues of citizenship - a political status shared by individuals of all religions and none - on any specific religious (or anti-religious) tradition of thinking about the good life. To do so risks turning the state into a representative of a specific religious tradition in a way that would relegate non-believers (in that specific religion) into second-class citizens.

For critics of liberalism like Blond, this implies that liberalism simply has no resources to offer any account of the common good or of virtue. This is a view which was set out by some 'communitarian' critics of liberalism in the academic political philosophy of the 1980s. Theologians and religious thinkers like Blond (and his former supervisor, John Milbank) are acutely aware of this communitarian critique of liberalism. In my experience, they are less aware of the liberal response to the communitarian critique and perhaps not as informed as they should be about the original liberal texts which were the focus of this critique.

For liberals can and do claim their own politics of virtue. Liberals argue that there is a way of thinking about the common good of individuals as citizens, independent of their religious and related views. According to liberals, individuals of diverse religious views share interests in goods such as life, security, freedom, and economic opportunity. They share an interest in seeing that these goods are secured by the state, and in a way that is just or fair. This is what liberals mean by social justice.

For liberals, our common good, then, is not related to some specific conception of the good life, but to social justice. Virtue - the virtue of the citizen - is to be understood relative to this good of social justice. This is why liberals can and should, quite consistently, support the promotion of attitudes and dispositions supportive of social justice: for example, attitudes of toleration and mutual respect across religious and cultural traditions; anti-discriminatory attitudes; and a disposition to show solidarity with those who may be less lucky than oneself in terms of access to economic opportunity. It is in this way, I think, that we can understand Marquand's call for a civic morality which puts materialistic self-interest in its place.

Of course, there is more to be said in this debate. The conservative critics will argue that one can't get far in saying what social justice is independent of a much thicker conception of the good life of the kind that religious traditions provide. The logical upshot of this view, forcefully articulated in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, is that political decision-making should be substantially devolved down to religious groups with the central state having little more than a 'night-watchman' role - a sort of communitarian libertarianism; or, less kindly, a federalism of theocracies.

Liberals argue in reply to this social vision that there are legitimate demands of social justice, e.g., in equality of opportunity, which have authority even if groups deny them, and which should be enforced by the state if need be over group preferences. This may or may not be correct, but it certainly doesn't indicate anything like 'relativism' or 'nihilism', a lack of a conception of a 'common good', or of a conception of 'virtue', on the part of the liberal.

In a move which is commonplace amongst conservative religious thinkers, Blond implicitly posits a dichotomy between religious tradition and virtue on the one hand, and liberalism and a silence on virtue on the other.

This is a choice we do not have to face. The real choice is about what kind of politics of virtue we want: a conservative, communitarian politics of virtue or a liberal-republican one. Read more...

The politics of virtue: conservative or liberal?

Phillip Blond has an article in today's Independent calling for a new politics of 'virtue'. According to Blond, both left and right have been guilty of peddling a moral relativism or nihilism which has created a moral vacuum at the heart of society and politics. The scandal around MPs' expenses is just one manifestation of this.

Blond writes:

'Clearly a new moral code is required. We need the concept of virtue. This ancient Greek and Christian notion transcends the current malaise and calls us to debate and discern the common civic good that alone is the basis for society. While contemporary morals abandon any notion of education and validate us and our "opinions" whatever they may be, virtue approaches humans on the basis of what they ought to be. Since virtue theory accepts the mediation of truth by time and context, it avoids the slide into exculpatory left-wing relativism. And it endorses culture and transformation. It takes moral conservatism out of the hands of an established elite and transfers it to us all.'

There is an interesting similarity here with a column by David Marquand in last week's Guardian. In an essay which contributes to clarifying the distinction between republican and populist responses to the present crisis, Marquand argues that the present economic and constitutional crisis reveals the poverty and redundancy of a 'neo-liberal moral economy' based on the celebration of material self-interest. Marquand writes:

'Now the neoliberal idyll is over. The casino has shut its doors. The neoliberal moral economy is in crisis. But the crisis is not the work of greedy bankers, lax regulators or corrupt MPs alone: they are only grubby flotsam floating on much deeper currents. It will not be ­resolved unless and until we acknowledge that we, the "people", are also part of the problem – that the real culprit is the hyper-individualistic, materialistic hedonism of the entire culture, popular at least as much as elite. I have been committed to radical constitutional reform for 30 years, and I rejoice at its belated appearance on the political agenda.

'But constitutional reform is not an end in ­itself. As John Milton and the Levellers insisted in the 17th century, and RH Tawney insisted in the 20th, it is a means to the greater end of moral reform, and without moral reform it would be an empty shell.'

Are Blond and Marquand making the same argument? Is this a point of convergence between the 'progressive conservatism' of Blond and the democratic republicanism of Marquand? If so, what are liberals to make of it?

It is hard to answer these questions definitively on the basis of these words alone, but there is potentially quite a big philosophical difference between Blond and Marquand - and one that tells in favour of Marquand, in my view.

The virtues are relative to some good. To have a 'virtue' is to have some quality or disposition of character which is relevant to achieving some kind of good. But what kind of good are we talking about?

Within the liberal tradition, we start from the insight that, in a free society, reasonable people disagree about the nature of the good life. Is there a God (or are there gods)? What does He/She/they require of us? How do we respond to the (alleged) absence of a God? These questions are central to discussion of the 'good life', and they are questions which reasonable people do, and probably always will, disagree about.

So a liberal will hesitate to rest an account of the virtues of citizenship - a political status shared by individuals of all religions and none - on any specific religious (or anti-religious) tradition of thinking about the good life. To do so risks turning the state into a representative of a specific religious tradition in a way that would relegate non-believers (in that specific religion) into second-class citizens.

For critics of liberalism like Blond, this implies that liberalism simply has no resources to offer any account of the common good or of virtue. This is a view which was set out by some 'communitarian' critics of liberalism in the academic political philosophy of the 1980s. Theologians and religious thinkers like Blond (and his former supervisor, John Milbank) are acutely aware of this communitarian critique of liberalism. In my experience, they are less aware of the liberal response to the communitarian critique and perhaps not as informed as they should be about the original liberal texts which were the focus of this critique.

For liberals can and do claim their own politics of virtue. Liberals argue that there is a way of thinking about the common good of individuals as citizens, independent of their religious and related views. According to liberals, individuals of diverse religious views share interests in goods such as life, security, freedom, and economic opportunity. They share an interest in seeing that these goods are secured by the state, and in a way that is just or fair. This is what liberals mean by social justice.

For liberals, our common good, then, is not related to some specific conception of the good life, but to social justice. Virtue - the virtue of the citizen - is to be understood relative to this good of social justice. This is why liberals can and should, quite consistently, support the promotion of attitudes and dispositions supportive of social justice: for example, attitudes of toleration and mutual respect across religious and cultural traditions; anti-discriminatory attitudes; and a disposition to show solidarity with those who may be less lucky than oneself in terms of access to economic opportunity. It is in this way, I think, that we can understand Marquand's call for a civic morality which puts materialistic self-interest in its place.

Of course, there is more to be said in this debate. The conservative critics will argue that one can't get far in saying what social justice is independent of a much thicker conception of the good life of the kind that religious traditions provide. The logical upshot of this view, forcefully articulated in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre, is that political decision-making should be substantially devolved down to religious groups with the central state having little more than a 'night-watchman' role - a sort of communitarian libertarianism; or, less kindly, a federalism of theocracies.

Liberals argue in reply to this social vision that there are legitimate demands of social justice, e.g., in equality of opportunity, which have authority even if groups deny them, and which should be enforced by the state if need be over group preferences. This may or may not be correct, but it certainly doesn't indicate anything like 'relativism' or 'nihilism', a lack of a conception of a 'common good', or of a conception of 'virtue', on the part of the liberal.

In a move which is commonplace amongst conservative religious thinkers, Blond implicitly posits a dichotomy between religious tradition and virtue on the one hand, and liberalism and a silence on virtue on the other.

This is a choice we do not have to face. The real choice is about what kind of politics of virtue we want: a conservative, communitarian politics of virtue or a liberal-republican one. Read more...

"Tory win would bring fervour to independence movement "

Guest blog by Mark Perryman

Labour has always been essentially a Unionist party. Scottish Labour for decades was deeply divided over devolution, though this changed in 1997 when the party united behind Tony Blair’s devolution settlement. In Wales the change in party culture has been even more significant with Welsh Labour in coalition with Plaid Cymru. Yet at the centre the Brown government continues to campaign vigorously in favour of Britishness, Britsh values, and most notoriously at Brown’s inaugural party conference ‘British Jobs for British Workers, with – just in case the point might be lost – a huge Union Jack as the platform backdrop.

The process of devolution which began a decade ago with elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly is now irreversible, no mainstream party seeks to reverse this shift and while fracture into four independent nations is not immediately likely the once united Kingdom is certainly not what it was. This is often ignored by the Westminster-fixated political class and their hangers-on. Perhaps because however central England might become in any eventual fracture, the separation is being driven not from what has traditionally considered itself the centre, but from nations that have been previously relegated to the margins.

Ten years of devolution have begun the transformation of the British state. The next ten years could well see these gradualist beginnings take more drastic shape. A General Election in 2010 with a Cameron majority built on English seats yet minority suppprt in Scotland and Wales will surely create immense constitutional pressures. A year later elections will follow to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. Despite the Tories rising fortunes under Cameron there is absolutely no evidence of a significant recovery of his party in either Scotland or Wales. Labour will be reeling from the 2010 defeat. Having propped the party up with millionaire donations and turned their annual conference into a money-making corporate trade fair Labour will struggle to hold its social and organisational fabric together. Party membership which soared when Blair became leader has plummeted ever since, demoralisation and disorientation will now deepen. Through three consecutive General Election defeats, 1979-1992, Labour maintained the semblance of effective opposition because the promise of a Labour Government remained for millions the alternative to Thatcherism. After 2010 that prospect may not have the compelling purpose it once had, certainly not in the immediate aftermath of the wasted opportunity for change that the new Labour years will come to represent after being defeated by Cameron’s Blair-lite Tories. The trade unions, who for all the glitzy rhetoric of modernisation remain the foundation of Labour’s finances and infrastructure will themselves be suffering from the impact of the recession on their members. Many of whom will be questioning what their support for Labour has earned the unions in terms of influence.

There couldn’t be a worse situation for Labour to campaign to restrict Scotland and Wales to more-or-less the current devolution settlement in the 2011 elections. Nationalist fervour, fundamentally anti-Tory, will be rampant, perhaps not with the breadth to secure independence in a referendum but almost certainly a solid enough bloc to entrench the movement towards that ambition.

In Scotland and Wales after 2010 independence won’t simply be an end in itself. In place of British labourism it will be the purpose of opposition, and unlike 1979-1997 thanks to Labour the institutions to fulfil that ambition now exist.

Mark Perryman is the Editor of Breaking-Up Britain : Four Nations after a Union. Available from www.lwbooks.co.uk.

A free download of Mark’s keynote essay in the book ‘ A Jigsaw State’ is available from www.lwbooks.co.uk/books/archive/Breaking_up_Britain_Perrryman.pdf Read more...

"Tory win would bring fervour to independence movement "

Guest blog by Mark Perryman

Labour has always been essentially a Unionist party. Scottish Labour for decades was deeply divided over devolution, though this changed in 1997 when the party united behind Tony Blair’s devolution settlement. In Wales the change in party culture has been even more significant with Welsh Labour in coalition with Plaid Cymru. Yet at the centre the Brown government continues to campaign vigorously in favour of Britishness, Britsh values, and most notoriously at Brown’s inaugural party conference ‘British Jobs for British Workers, with – just in case the point might be lost – a huge Union Jack as the platform backdrop.

The process of devolution which began a decade ago with elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly is now irreversible, no mainstream party seeks to reverse this shift and while fracture into four independent nations is not immediately likely the once united Kingdom is certainly not what it was. This is often ignored by the Westminster-fixated political class and their hangers-on. Perhaps because however central England might become in any eventual fracture, the separation is being driven not from what has traditionally considered itself the centre, but from nations that have been previously relegated to the margins.

Ten years of devolution have begun the transformation of the British state. The next ten years could well see these gradualist beginnings take more drastic shape. A General Election in 2010 with a Cameron majority built on English seats yet minority suppprt in Scotland and Wales will surely create immense constitutional pressures. A year later elections will follow to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. Despite the Tories rising fortunes under Cameron there is absolutely no evidence of a significant recovery of his party in either Scotland or Wales. Labour will be reeling from the 2010 defeat. Having propped the party up with millionaire donations and turned their annual conference into a money-making corporate trade fair Labour will struggle to hold its social and organisational fabric together. Party membership which soared when Blair became leader has plummeted ever since, demoralisation and disorientation will now deepen. Through three consecutive General Election defeats, 1979-1992, Labour maintained the semblance of effective opposition because the promise of a Labour Government remained for millions the alternative to Thatcherism. After 2010 that prospect may not have the compelling purpose it once had, certainly not in the immediate aftermath of the wasted opportunity for change that the new Labour years will come to represent after being defeated by Cameron’s Blair-lite Tories. The trade unions, who for all the glitzy rhetoric of modernisation remain the foundation of Labour’s finances and infrastructure will themselves be suffering from the impact of the recession on their members. Many of whom will be questioning what their support for Labour has earned the unions in terms of influence.

There couldn’t be a worse situation for Labour to campaign to restrict Scotland and Wales to more-or-less the current devolution settlement in the 2011 elections. Nationalist fervour, fundamentally anti-Tory, will be rampant, perhaps not with the breadth to secure independence in a referendum but almost certainly a solid enough bloc to entrench the movement towards that ambition.

In Scotland and Wales after 2010 independence won’t simply be an end in itself. In place of British labourism it will be the purpose of opposition, and unlike 1979-1997 thanks to Labour the institutions to fulfil that ambition now exist.

Mark Perryman is the Editor of Breaking-Up Britain : Four Nations after a Union. Available from www.lwbooks.co.uk.

A free download of Mark’s keynote essay in the book ‘ A Jigsaw State’ is available from www.lwbooks.co.uk/books/archive/Breaking_up_Britain_Perrryman.pdf Read more...

A dilemma for Liberal Democrats

The Liberal Democrats are having a good crisis - within the political classes at least.

For those following the details of the expenses crisis, no LibDem MP has been among the worst offenders. To date, LibDem misdemeanours have been relatively trivial.

The party has a strong record on political reform, which is now the theme of the moment, leading influential Observer columnist Andrew Rawnsley to suggest that they have the most credibility on electoral reform.

So Sunday's Observer also endorsed the LibDems for the European elections - which I think it the first national newspaper endorsement of the party in a national election (though The Independent came close to doing so in the 2005 General Election, while The Guardian habitually offers a hybrid Lab-Lib endorsement).

But making as much progress with voters as with liberal commentators may be more difficult. Where the public mood is "a plague on all of your houses", then the LibDems can expect to be its victims as much as its beneficiaries. One poll sees them edge Labour, but another has the party fourth in the European elections.

This presents Nick Clegg and the LibDem leadership with an important dilemma.

One obvious response is to burnish the party's "outsider" credentials. There is a long Liberal and LibDem tradition of portraying the reds and blues as a two-party establishment - tweedledum and tweedledee - and the yellows as the radicals who can break the mould. Senior LibDems spend a lot of time pushing this idea.

But that is not enough. The LibDems will never win an anti-politics auction to be the party which is furthest outside the political establishment.

In different ways, the Greens, UKIP and a whole host of fringe parties of every variety (from the Jury Team to the BNP) can trump them on that. What has pejoratively called the "dustbin vote can switch between parties with diametrically opposed views. Whatever their opponents can say about the highly variable nature of local LibDemmery, the national party has been serious on the economy, climate change and political reform and has mostly tended to eschew cheap populism leading it into positions that it can not credibly defend. Tuition fees have been the most glaring exception to this).

If the LibDems need to show that they have an edge over smaller parties, it is the constructive, pro-politics case that they are better placed to make change happen. Nick Clegg's 100 day plan for political reform is an imaginative way to project the party's case that radical change is both necessary and possible. This depends on opposing "politics as usual" yet also on the party's credibility, knowledge and political strength inside the system.

It depends on not being an 'establishment party' - yet also on building alliances for change on the inside.

Firstly, Nick Clegg wants to set the agenda for change in a Parliament where he has less than 10 per cent of the seats. He has made a good start - offering a much deeper and more coherent agenda than David Cameron - and so setting the bar as to what the government needs to do to revive its own interest in a 'new constitutional settlement'.

Secondly, the purpose of the LibDem agenda and its broader political strategy is to bring about a different politics - one in which cooperation between parties is part of a more pluralist political culture.

Many LibDems will be rationally sceptical of renewed Labour interest in progressive alliances. They need to be confident not just that they will not be stitched up - but that this is not a moment for a stitch up between political parties. (This may make renewed Labour interest in a constitutional convention important - Progress have launched a campaign for this, which I support).

Yet, while there should be many questions about the timing and nature of cooperation across party boundaries, it is also the only plausible way in which the LibDems' own agenda for reform could be realised at what could be its most promising - if potentially treacherous - moment for decades. Read more...

A dilemma for Liberal Democrats

The Liberal Democrats are having a good crisis - within the political classes at least.

For those following the details of the expenses crisis, no LibDem MP has been among the worst offenders. To date, LibDem misdemeanours have been relatively trivial.

The party has a strong record on political reform, which is now the theme of the moment, leading influential Observer columnist Andrew Rawnsley to suggest that they have the most credibility on electoral reform.

So Sunday's Observer also endorsed the LibDems for the European elections - which I think it the first national newspaper endorsement of the party in a national election (though The Independent came close to doing so in the 2005 General Election, while The Guardian habitually offers a hybrid Lab-Lib endorsement).

But making as much progress with voters as with liberal commentators may be more difficult. Where the public mood is "a plague on all of your houses", then the LibDems can expect to be its victims as much as its beneficiaries. One poll sees them edge Labour, but another has the party fourth in the European elections.

This presents Nick Clegg and the LibDem leadership with an important dilemma.

One obvious response is to burnish the party's "outsider" credentials. There is a long Liberal and LibDem tradition of portraying the reds and blues as a two-party establishment - tweedledum and tweedledee - and the yellows as the radicals who can break the mould. Senior LibDems spend a lot of time pushing this idea.

But that is not enough. The LibDems will never win an anti-politics auction to be the party which is furthest outside the political establishment.

In different ways, the Greens, UKIP and a whole host of fringe parties of every variety (from the Jury Team to the BNP) can trump them on that. What has pejoratively called the "dustbin vote can switch between parties with diametrically opposed views. Whatever their opponents can say about the highly variable nature of local LibDemmery, the national party has been serious on the economy, climate change and political reform and has mostly tended to eschew cheap populism leading it into positions that it can not credibly defend. Tuition fees have been the most glaring exception to this).

If the LibDems need to show that they have an edge over smaller parties, it is the constructive, pro-politics case that they are better placed to make change happen. Nick Clegg's 100 day plan for political reform is an imaginative way to project the party's case that radical change is both necessary and possible. This depends on opposing "politics as usual" yet also on the party's credibility, knowledge and political strength inside the system.

It depends on not being an 'establishment party' - yet also on building alliances for change on the inside.

Firstly, Nick Clegg wants to set the agenda for change in a Parliament where he has less than 10 per cent of the seats. He has made a good start - offering a much deeper and more coherent agenda than David Cameron - and so setting the bar as to what the government needs to do to revive its own interest in a 'new constitutional settlement'.

Secondly, the purpose of the LibDem agenda and its broader political strategy is to bring about a different politics - one in which cooperation between parties is part of a more pluralist political culture.

Many LibDems will be rationally sceptical of renewed Labour interest in progressive alliances. They need to be confident not just that they will not be stitched up - but that this is not a moment for a stitch up between political parties. (This may make renewed Labour interest in a constitutional convention important - Progress have launched a campaign for this, which I support).

Yet, while there should be many questions about the timing and nature of cooperation across party boundaries, it is also the only plausible way in which the LibDems' own agenda for reform could be realised at what could be its most promising - if potentially treacherous - moment for decades. Read more...

Why we wuz robbed at Wembley

What to do if offered a ticket for your team's first FA Cup final for fourteen years while on paternity leave is one of those existential dilemmas for which there is no correct answer. So I can't offer any particular rationalisation of how I found myself escaping for a few hours to be at Wembley on Saturday. It was a great day out, with a disappointing result for Evertonians.

The Sunday papers agreed that this was one of the better Cup finals of recent years and all noted just how much Everton's fans brought to the occasion - outsinging Chelsea even in the minute after the final whistle blew- but the team could not hold on to their first minute lead, and Chelsea were clearly the stronger side after going 2-1 ahead.

That Everton were universally billed as plucky underdogs and unlikely finalists, despite having finished 5th in the league for the second season in a row, offered a striking illustration of the stratification into a new caste system. The bookies (sensibly) offered odds of 2:1 on Cup final morning against the Cup going to Merseyside.

You can see why when Chelsea's victory means that the 'big four' end up winning 19 of the 20 League titles and FA Cups this decade, denied a clean sweep only by Portsmouth's FA Cup victory in 2008. Five clubs have won the major domestic trophies in this decade - the most predictable and least broadly contested in English football history - yet twelve clubs shared those 20 trophies in the 1970s, when there were six league champions and nine different FA Cup winners.

The Fabian Society's research into football's collapsed social mobility also showed how the pool of FA Cup winners has narrowed. The Cup winners have, on average, finished third in the league in this last decade, compared to 11th in the 1970s and 8th in the 1980s. (The first final I remember - and among the greatest ever - was in 1981 between Spurs and Man City sides who had finished 10th and 12th in the league).

The Times had an interesting factoid yesterday morning: that 11 of the last 13 finals have been won by the team finishing higher in the league. Tellingly, the only exceptions were the victories of Chelsea (2nd) over Manchester United in 2007, and Liverpool (3rd) over Arsenal (2nd) in 2001.

This may explain why great Cup finals are now so few and far between: those finals with the potential to emulate historic upsets having too often turned into mismatches. Indeed, there has been only one classic in the Premiership years: the West Ham-Liverpool game in 2006. By contrast, in the previous two decades, the Cup finals of 1973, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1983, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989 and 1991 were among those which could all stake reasonable claims to the all-time classics list.

The issue of predictability and stratification is increasingly dominant in the sports pages. Both Mark Reason in The Sunday Telegraph and Rod Liddle in the Sunday Times wrote about predictability killing the Cup on Sunday.

As Reason wrote:

OK, so occasionally miracles do happen. Last year, Portsmouth beat Cardiff City in the final. But that was a freak of nature – 17 of the previous 19 Cup finals have been won by Chelsea, Manchester United, Arsenal or Liverpool. Predictability kills nostalgia.
Who can really, truly remember much about those past 19 finals? ... If Saha's goal had proved the winner, if apples were oranges we might still have a smidgeon of faith. But a lot of us are now atheists as far as the FA Cup is concerned.

I was among those (mildly) offended by ITV's marketing of a "week of finals" to cross-promote the European Cup and FA Cup finals with the grand final of Britain's Got Talent.

Sacrilege.

Yet unlike the Wembley showpiece, the talent show did provide the kind of last minute giant-killing shock for which the FA Cup was once famous. Read more...